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FILED IN OFFICE 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COul' rr I", 
STATE OF GEORGIA DEC 202007 r" 
MARTIN D. MARCHMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JACK FISHER, 
Defendant. 
) 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY GA 
) Civil Action No.: 2005CVlOI076 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
BRIEF, MOTION TO STRIKE CERTAIN AFFIDAVITS, AND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On November 20,2007, counsel appeared to present oral argument on 
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Martin D. Marchman and Elda N. Fox and 
the Exhibits Thereto, filed November 15, 2007; Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of 
Plaintiffs Response Brief and for Sanctions, filed November 15, 2007; and Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 1,2007. After reviewing the briefs, the 
arguments presented, and the record of the case, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts: 
_=~.~_,=~=~"~~_"J21~St; inv2ty.S'_.th~,!S!i2!!.~1.!~~~~~iness :elat!2~lE~~ ___ ,,~~ 
Plaintiff and Defendant. At the heart of the controversies in this case, are Plaintiff s 
claims that he and Defendant were partners in their real estate development endeavors. 
Plaintiff and Defendant, an accountant, had a working relationship for twenty 
years prior to their collaboration in real estate development, which began in 1997. 
() 
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o Defendant, through his company Castle Communities, LLC, formed Glass-Moore, 
LLC ("GM"). Plaintiff was never a shareholder of GM. 
On October 14, 1997, GM entered into a purchase and sale agreement ("PSA") 
with Plaintiff to acquire from Plaintiff a package of real estate assets including contracts, 
subdivisions, options, land, and developments. As a condition of the PSA, Plaintiff and 
GM entered into a renewable, 2-year term, employment agreement ("EA"). Under the 
EA, Plaintiff was named the VP of Land Acquisitions for GM, paid an annual salary, 
received discretionary bonuses, and charged significant personal expenses to GM. 
Plaintiff asserts that prior to entering into the PSA and the EA, he and Defendant agreed 
to operate as partners, essentially through GM, as real estate developers. Defendant 
denies that he and Plaintiff had any agreement outside of the PSA and EA between 
o Plaintiff and GM. 
Plaintiff and Defendant worked closely together on several real estate projects 
between 1997 and 2001. As GM finished one project, Defendant and Plaintiff would 
identify and start another development project so that at the end of the relationship there 
were several developments which GM had facilitated. 
-'. - -- '.'.-".- --~. - -~ 
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As a preliminary matter, the Court must address Defendant's challenges to 
=~::==pia;~ffii';;esp~-;;seTrFef';nd '~~pp~rti~g-ao~~~~~~ to th~Moti~·~ f~; Sd;;;;ary~---->~~-~u",~" 
Judgment. 
A. Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Response Brief and for Sanctions 
Defendant requests that the Johnson Memo, which is defined in, and which is the 
C) subject of an earlier Court Order, dated October 15,2007, and all references to it be 
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stricken from Plaintiffs response brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In the previous Order, this Court found that Defendant's statements in the Johnson Memo 
did not rise to the level of perjury or fraud at the time so as to warrant the application of 
the crime/fraud exception to the attorney client privilege. The circumstances here remain 
the same, thus, the Johnson Memo and all references to it shall be stricken from 
Plaintiff s response brief. 
B. Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Martin D. Marchman and EIda N. Fox 
and Exhibits Thereto 
Defendant petitions this Court to strike two of Plaintiff s affidavits-the affidavits 
of Plaintiff Marchman and of Ms. Fox-submitted in opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant claims that the affidavits and the attached exhibits 
failed to meet the standards established in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e), which describes the 
type and form of evidence appropriate to be considered on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
To summarize the numerous objections, Defendantchallenges Ms. Fox's affidavit 
and the exhibits to both her affidavit and Plaintiff s affidavit as not having a proper 
foundation or authentication and for containing inadmissible statements of hearsay or 
opinion. In addition, Defendant challenges Plaintiff Marchman's affidavit as being self-
Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 28 (1986). Prophecy holds that, on a motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court must construct self-contradictory testimony against the party 
offering it, if such testimony is the only evidence in his favor on the dispositive issue of 
the case. Defendant contends that the Marchman affidavit directly contradicts his earlier 
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o deposition testimony, and is the only evidence in the record that speaks to the terms of 
the alleged partnership agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that each exhibit attached to the challenged 
affidavits, with the exception of Exhibit V & W, were exhibits to discovery, previously 
entered into the record. "(T)he court is obliged to take account of the entire setting of the 
case on a Rule 56 motion. In addition to the pleadings, it will consider all papers of 
record, as well as any material prepared for the motion that meets the standard prescribed 
in Rule 56(e)." Glisson v. Morton, 203, Ga. App. 77, 77 (1992) (emphasis in original) 
(upholding a trial court's consideration of unsworn documents and hearsay-challenged 
testimony on a motion for summary judgment, which were produced in the course of 
discovery). 
Plaintiff also insists that the affidavits did not contain inadmissible statements of 
hearsay or opinion, but were based on personal knowledge. O.C.G.A. § 9-l1-56(e) 
requires that evidence in the record contain personal knowledge and be based upon 
admissible facts. Affidavits must set forth facts that would be admissible at trial and may 
personal knowledge "is generally sufficient to meet the requirement that affidavits be 
,~o,'"'., ....-.-_"""C.-'" ,orC,...",--_~,-:,.....,.,=e-".'"""="""·""~<""=.",,,~,,,,,,,,,,,-,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"=-;o;,== __ ..,,,,"'~--"="''''"'"'''''"''--.~''*"'''''''''''''~<="''''''',,"-'''~~''''''"'''''''''.~==~-~_ =<:--'=.--==~'=~' ==~ 
. maGe upon such kIiowledge." ld. ~ - .- _._-
The Court agrees that the exhibits attached to the affidavits, with the exception of 
Exhibits V and W, were a part of the discovery record in the case and therefore should be 
considered. Additionally, the Marchman and the Fox affidavits contain statements that 
C) the contents are based upon their "personal knowledge and information." 
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Paragraph 9, however, of the Fox affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay 
statements and shall be stricken from the record. Id. ("[iJf it appears that any portion of 
the affidavit was not made upon the affiant's personal knowledge ... that portion is to be 
disregarded in considering the affidavit in connection with the motion for summary 
judgment.) 
Thus, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Fox Affidavit and Exhibits Thereto is 
DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Paragraph 9 of the Fox affidavit 
and Exhibits V and Ware stricken from the record, everything else remains. 
In addition, the Marchman affidavit is not contradictory to Plaintiff s earlier 
deposition testimony when read in its entirety rather than just the few passages 
highlighted by Defendant. Nor is it the only evidence purporting to establish the terms of 
the alleged oral partnership between Plaintiff and Defendant. There is some other, 
although slim, evidence in the record. Thus, the stringent standard of Prophecy has not 
been met in this case, and the evidence is sufficient to raise a credibility question best 
determined by a jury. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Marchman Affidavit is 
DENIED. 
III. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
To prevail on his motion for summary judgment, Defendant must demonstrate that 
"there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most favorable" to 
Plaintiff, "to warrant judgment as a matter oflaw." Lau's Com. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 
(1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532 (2005). 
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A. Oral Contract for Partnership 
The threshold question in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is whether 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable oral partnership agreement. 
"A partnership results from a contract, either express or implied." Waugh v. 
Waugh, 265 Ga. App. 799, 801 (2004), citing, Clark v. Schwartz, 210 Ga. App. 678 
(1993). Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant entered into an oral partnership agreement 
to invest in and develop real estate and to share the profits. 
Whether a partnership has been formed can be evaluated from several factors such 
as whether the parties held themselves out as partners, engaged in a common enterprise, 
shared risk, shared loss, shared profits, or shared control. O.C.G.A. § 14-8-7; Aaron 
Rents Inc. v. Fourteenth Street Venture LP, 243 Ga. App. 746 (2000); Vitner v. Funk, 
182 Ga. App. 39 (1987). Determining the existence of a partnership involves a review of 
the parties' course of dealing and the totality of circumstances. Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. 
App. 39, 43; Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397,415 -416 (N.D.Ga., 1982). 
In addition to challenging the existence of an oral partnership agreement, 
Defendant challenges the enforceability of such an alleged agreement on the grounds that 
any agreement between parties was void for vagueness and too indefinite to enforce. 
"Parties must agree to all material terms for a contract to be enforceable." 
O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2; Burns v. Dees, 252 Ga. App. 598,601-602 (2001) ("A contract 
cannot be enforced if its terms are incomplete, vague, indefinite or uncertain."). Failing 
to determine the length, scope, or structure of an oral partnership can be fatal to enforcing 
an oral partnership agreement. See e.g., Razavi v. Shackelford, 260 Ga. App. 603 (2003) 
(refusing to enforce an oral partnership agreement because it was too indefinite with 
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regard to duration, payment and subject matter, which part performance could not cure); 
Cherokee Falls Investments v. Smith, 213 Ga. App. 603 (1994) (refusing to enforce a 
joint venture as evidenced by a purchase/sale agreement because without determining the 
timing, the cost or the performance, the oral agreement was too indefinite). 
Defendant also challenges the alleged oral partnership agreement under the statute 
of frauds, which requires, among other things, that oral contracts must be capable of 
performance within one year. D.CG.A. § 13-5-30. See e.g., Lemming v. Morgan, 228 
Ga. App. 763, 764 (1998) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for defendant on an 
oral partnership agreement to develop real estate and in which the plaintiff claimed a 50% 
interest because the contract was unenforceable under the statue of frauds). 
The alleged partnership between Plaintiff and Defendant extended from 1997 
through 2001. Defendant asserts that the four year duration of the partnership violates 
the one year rule under the statute of frauds. Plaintiff, instead, directs the Court to the 
holding that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to "an agreement for an indefinite period 
terminable at will." Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 43 (1987). Thus, Plaintiff argues 
there was no writing requirement for their partnership agreement. 
In addition, Plaintiff argues that if this Court were to hold that a written contract 
was required under the statute of frauds, that Plaintiffs performance (i.e., his sweat 
equity) cures any statute of frauds defects. Defendant, however, counters that even 
performance cannot cure an indefinite contract. See,~, Razavi v. Shackelford, 260 Ga. 
App. 603 (2005). 
Despite having an employer/employee relationship, Plaintiff presented deposition 
testimony of other co-workers and colleagues who "understood" Plaintiff and Defendant 
7 
() to be "partners". Plaintiff alleges that his partnership agreement with Defendant was for 
an indefinite period of time, terminable at will, with net profits to be shared 50/50. 
Plaintiff alleges that the partnership was a rolling investment scheme where the profits of 
one project would be rolled into the next, with final reconciliations/distributions to be 
made whenever they separated as partners. Plaintiff contends that he and Defendant 
shared expenses, that he received a portion of profits through the use of GM's credit card, 
periodic cash divisions, and a share of the profits from the Peachtree Powers project. 
To establish these terms, Plaintiff points to his deposition testimony, his 
supplemental affidavit, Exhibit B to his affidavit which references a 50% profit split 
between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Elda Fox's deposition and affidavit statements. 
This evidence, however thin, creates a valid question of credibility and fact appropriate 
() for a jury to determine. In addition, there may be evidence sufficient to take the 
agreement out of the statute of frauds 
Finally, Defendant challenges the finding of an oral partnership agreement 
between the parties because Plaintiff and GM entered into the PSA and EA, which 
contain a merger clause. Defendant urges this Court to define Plaintiff siegal 
relationship and rights with respect to Defendant according to the terms of PSA and EA. 
This argument, however, overlooks that Plaintiff contracted with Defendant's company, 
GM, not with Defendant himself. Thus, these agreements are determinative with respect 
to Plaintiffs' rights and causes of action against GM, but not Defendant individually. 
In accordance with the above-stated reasoning, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Contract, is DENIED. 
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B. Misrepresentation and Fraud 
Defendant moves for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's misrepresentation and 
fraud allegations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's statements regarding the splitting of 
future profits were fraudulent. To establish a claim for fraud, Plaintiff must demonstrate 
that (1) Defendant made false representations of fact with scienter, and intent to induce 
him to act or refrain from acting, (2) that Plaintiff justifiably relied upon such statements, 
and (3) that damages flowed there from. Pyle v. City of Cedartown, 240 Ga. App. 445 
(1999); Reeves v. Edge, 225 Ga. App. 615 (1997). Similarly, to establish a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation, Plaintiff must establish that (1) Defendant supplied false 
information to him, (2) Plaintiff reasonably relied upon such false information, and (3) 
economic injury resulted there from. Marquis Towers, Inc. v. Highland Group, 265 Ga. 
App, 343 (2004). Plaintiff failed to support his allegations of false information or 
inducement sufficient to survive Defendant's motion. Thus, Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's allegations of Misrepresentation and Fraud is 
GRANTED. 
C. Unjust Enrichment and Implied Trust 
Plaintiff pleas in the alternative that if there is no oral partnership agreement 
between him and Defendant, then Plaintiff is owed money under a theory of unjust 
enrichment requiring the partnership proceeds to be held in an implied trust. Because the 
underlying issue of whether or not the parties entered into an enforceable oral contract 
has been reserved for a jury determination, so too must the issue of unjust enrichment and 
an implied trust. Razavi v. Shackelford, 260 Ga. App. 603 (2003) (holding that the claim 
of quantum meruit raised questions of fact that survived summary jUdgment). Therefore, 
9 
o Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claims of Unjust Enrichment 
and Implied Trust is DENIED. 
D. Remaining Counts 
The remaining counts on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are all 
related to the central question of whether or not an oral partnership agreement was 
formed between the parties. Thus, without resolving that threshold question, Plaintiffs 
remaining counts also survive Defendant's motion. Thus, Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Misappropriation of Corporate Opportunity, Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty, and Conversion is DENIED. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the above-stated reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED, but GRANTED as to misrepresentation and fraud. In reaching its conclusion, 
the Court did not consider the Johnson Memo, or any references thereto, Exhibits V and 
W to the Marchman and Fox Affidavits, or Paragraph 9 of the Fox Affidavit. 
DGE 
IJ 
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Copies to: 
Rosemary S. Annstrong, Esq. 
BURTON & ARMSTRONG LLP 
Two Ravinia Drive, Suite 1750 
Atlanta, GA 30346 
Kelley Amanda Lee, Esq,. 
John G. Perry, Esq. 
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE PC 
120 I West Peachtree Street, Suite 3500 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
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